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Introduction
The prospect of membership in the European Union has a powerful 
transformative effect, as it invites positive democratic, political, economic 
and societal changes to be brought.1 These changes entail the alignment 
of the acceding country’s legal, economic and political system with the 
framework of the European Union and its legal system. This process has 
come to be known as Europeanization, and has gained in significance 
as countries that were formerly ruled by autocrats started their path of 
European integration. Europeanization of law, i.e. the changing of the 
country’s legal system in the perspective of accession to the EU, is a 
consequence of the influence of European integration on the domestic 
legal systems of countries aspiring to EU membership. The constitution 
is by no means free from this influence, which is why we can talk about 
the Europeanization of a country’s constitution and its constitutional law 
(Vorpsi, 2016, pp. 166-167).These changes emerge from the fact that the 
1) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region. EU 
Enlargement Strategy. Brussels, 10.11.2015, p. 2. 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN SERBIA IN THE PERSPECTIVE 





This paper deals with the process of constitutional reform in Serbia in 
the context of European integration. Serbia has officially started the 
negotiations process for European Union membership, something which 
will require Serbia to conduct fundamental changes to its legal, economic 
and political system. Changes will also have to be introduced to Serbia’s 
Constitution. These changes, ultimately, will lead to the Europeanization 
of Serbian constitutional law and should enable this country’s smooth 
and transparent transition towards membership in the Union.
Keywords: Europeanization; European Integration; Constitution; 

















40 Epiphany: Journal of Transdisciplinary Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2, (2016) © Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
EU is no ordinary international organization- rather it is a supranational 
sui generis entity, based on a set of rules embedded in its Founding 
Treaties, which are considered a ’constitutional charter’ (Les Verts, Case 
294/83, [1986] E.C.R.). The EU legal system is therefore considered an 
autonomous, independent legal order, often leading to the Union being 
characterized as a quasi-federal construction (Borchard, 2010, pp. 31-32).
Serbia has gone a long way from being the only Western Balkan 
(WB) country that was denied European perspective and the status of a 
potential candidate country, to having opened the negotiations with the 
EU and seeking to fulfill all of the obligations stemming from the accession 
process by the year of 2020. It has been noted, both in international2 and 
domestic3 publications, that Serbia would not be able to enter the Union 
with this kind of a constitutional framework. This is why Serbia has 
already pledged to conduct changes in some parts of the Constitution, in 
order to meet the criteria of rule of law and sustainability of democratic 
institutions. On the other hand, there are also other constitutional 
deficiencies that need to be addressed, if Serbia is to secure for itself a 
smooth and legal transition towards EU membership.4
Serbia’s European Integration Path
Before becoming an independent state, Serbia was part of the Socialist 
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). During the Cold War, the 
communist bloc in Eastern Europe, as a response to the formation of 
the European Economic Community (EEC), established its very own 
organization for economic cooperation, named the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia did not participate within 
this structure, since it had a more independent and neutral foreign policy 
2) European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission).Opinion 
on the Constitution of Serbia.March 2007.
3) Antonijević, M. et al (2013).Ustav Republike Srbije- sedam godina pravne neizvesnosti 
i pet prioriteta za promenu.Beograd: YUCOM (Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights).
4) There is an intense discussion developing on whether Serbia will have to leave out 
the reference to Kosovo from the Preamble of its Constitution, where it is stated that 
Kosovo is an autonomous region within Serbia. It has been pointed to the fact that 
the ‘erasing’ of Kosovo from the Preamble is a demand that stems out of the process 
of comprehensive normalization Belgrade is conducting with Pristina, situated 
within Chapter 35 of the accession negotiations. However, this issues, although 
widely significant, not only for Serbia’s internal affairs, but also for the international 
community as a whole, will not be analyzed in this paper, but only those changes that 
will affect Serbia’s constitutional system and its constitutional law. 
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orientation, than the other countries of the Eastern bloc. Therefore, it 
had an opportunity to cooperate with the West as well, something which 
Yugoslavia took advantage off in 1967, when it established diplomatic 
and political ties with the EECas the two partiessigned the Declaration on 
Mutual Relations. The relations were upgraded in the early 1970s with the 
signing of two trade agreements which granted Yugoslavia multiple trade 
concessions, as well as preferential treatment on the EEC market. These 
relations reached their peak in 1980 with the signing of the Cooperation 
Agreement, which regulated not only trade and economic cooperation, 
but covered such issues as agriculture, traffic, science and research, etc. 
The further advancement of relations came in 1990 as the EEC pledged to 
support Yugoslavia in the restructuring of its banking and finance control 
system. However, with the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia, the Cooperation 
Agreement was suspended and the EEC, which would in this period 
become the European Union (EU), joined in the United Nations Security 
Council sanctions against Serbia (Miščević, 2009, pp. 171-175).
With the dissolution of the SFRY, Serbia and Montenegro formed 
a new federation- the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). However, 
since the country was up until 2000 ruled by Slobodan Milosevic, there 
was no real possibility of reviving the relationship with the EU. On 
the other hand, due to conflicts on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia, the 
European Commission decided to envisage a new type of enlargement 
strategy towards this region (named the Western Balkans at this 
point). Having in mind the complexity of the situation in the WB, the 
Commission proposed a new type of a relationship within the countries 
of this region- the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP)- and 
confirmed the status of potential candidate countries to all WB states, 
with the exception of Yugoslavia. After the democratic revolution 
of 2000, Yugoslavia was admitted to the WB group and its European 
perspective was confirmed by the Commission (Crnić, 2016, pp. 12-13).
Problems were evident that the federal ties between Serbia and 
Montenegro were in trouble and that the very existence of the federation 
was under question. The EU stepped in, in the form of Javier Solana, 
then the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy, and the 
decision was taken to reprogramme the country into a state union, where 
it would be allowed to conduct a referendum of independence after three 
years have expired. That is exactly what happened, and in May 2006 
Montenegro declared its independence after a successful referendum. 
Serbia nevertheless continued with the SAP, and in April 2008 signed the 
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Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU. New trouble 
followed, as the ratification process was severely prolonged, sincesome 
member states of the EU had considerations, mostly bilateral in nature, 
which induced them into not ratifying the SAA with Serbia. Despite 
this, Serbia decided to unilaterally implement the obligations stemming 
from the SAA. Finally, the SAA came into force in September 2013after 
Lithuania’s ratification of the document (Crnić, 2016, pp. 18-19).
Montenegro’s independence was also a trigger for Serbia to adopt 
a new Constitution. Even though it was expected that constitutional 
reforms are going to be performed as early as 2000, i.e. with the 
fall of the Milosevic dictatorship, nevertheless these changes were 
postponed all the way until 2006. Many politicians even stated that the 
constitutional order inherited from the past does not prevent the new 
democratic government from functioning (Antonijević, 2013, p. 12). 
Nevertheless, Montenegro’s exit from the state union meant that the 
Constitutional Charter was not in effect anymore, and Serbia needed to 
regulate within a new constitution all of the areas previously regulated 
by the Constitutional Charter. This is why the government opted for the 
drafting process to be swift and quick, and the Constitution was drafted 
in a matter of weeks. However, this meant that the public was largely 
unaware of what was happening behind closed doors and could not 
express its approval or dissatisfaction with the proposed constitutional 
reform. After a successful referendum, the Constitution was proclaimed 
on the 8th November 2006. 
With the slowdown in the association process, Serbia turned to 
making further steps in the accession process. Following the application 
for membership made in 2009, the European Council granted Serbia 
the status of candidate country in March 2012 and decided to open the 
accession negotiations in June 2013, while the negotiations were formally 
opened in January 2014 when the first Intergovernmental Conference 
was held.5 Thus far, four negotiating Chapters have been opened, among 
which three are crucial: Chapters 23- which deals with judicial reform 
and human rights, 24- encompassing policies that fall within the Area 
of Justice, Freedom and Security- and 35- normally reserved for ‘other 
issues’, but in Serbia’s case refers to the normalization of the relations 
between Belgrade and Pristina.
5) European Commission, Serbia Progress Report, 2014, p. 3-4.
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The Reform of the Judiciary and the Prosecution 
The European Commission’s enlargement strategy towards WB was 
changed in 2012, so that the enlargement policy was re-shifted towards 
core issues such as rule of law, fundamental rights, strengthening 
democratic institutions, including public administration reform. The 
new approach was coined ‘fundamentals first’, and emerged as a need 
of ensuring that acceding countries are fully transformed in accordance 
with these core values of the EU, before they actually become full-fledged 
members.6 The new approach was a consequence of the experiences the 
Commission acquired with past waves of enlargement which involved 
Central and Eastern European countries, some of which went through 
severe crises with regard to the stability of their democratic institutions. 
Thus, on a more practical level, WB countries are faced with a new 
structure of the enlargement process. Namely, Chapters 23 and 24, 
which cover core issues of rule of law, human rights and security, will 
be opened at the very beginning of the negotiations, and will be closed 
only at the very end of the process. Moreover, the Commission has 
introduced a mechanism, called the ‘disequilibrium clause’, which 
allows the Commission to suspend the entire negotiations process if the 
country does not fulfill obligations stemming from Chapters 23 and 24 
(Petrović, Stojanović, Turkalj, 2015, p. 18).
The rule of law principle represents one of the key values enshrined 
in the EU Treaties (Article 2 of the TEU). With the reforms brought 
to the enlargement strategy, it is nowadays found at the heart of the 
accession process. Since the rule of law principle remains very broad, 
covering a whole range of issues, it needs to be narrowed down and 
operationalized in order to make it possible to assess the progress WB 
countries achieve in the accession process. Since most of these countries 
experienced significant problems with their judicial systems, which are 
not fully independent, but a target of political and criminal influence, 
strengthening the rule of law is particularly important in terms of 
improving the functioning and independence of the judiciary. EU 
primary law itself envisages the value of an independent and impartial 
judiciary, since the rights to fair trial is stipulated in Article 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, a document which has the 
6) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region, EU 
Enlargement Strategy, Brussels, 10.11.2015, p. 5-6.
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same legal standing as the Founding Treaties. Progress in the field of 
creating an independent an impartial judiciary in the WB countries 
is not going to be made without strong political will that will lead to 
tangible results.7 In a broader sense, this means that there ought to be 
commitment to eliminating external influence over the judiciary and to 
devote adequate financial resources and training. Legal guarantees need 
to be put into place for fair trials.8
In Serbia’s case, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by 
the Constitution, foremost by Article 4 which provides for the separation 
of powers. Serbia’s version of the right to a fair trial can be found in 
Article 32 of the Constitution, which declared the right for every person 
to a public hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. 
Also, Article 152 proscribes judges from entering politics. Functional 
immunity for judges is guaranteed by Article 151. Nevertheless, the 
Constitution does allow political influence: the National Assembly 
not only elects the President of the Supreme Court of Cassation and 
presidents of all other courts in the country, but it also elects to the 
post of a judge those persons who are elected to this position for the 
first time. All of this is done on the basis of proposals made by the High 
Judicial Council (HJC). Even though envisaged as an independent body, 
the HJC’s composition and the election of its members reflects strong 
political interference, and the HJC has failed to react publicly in protection 
of judicial independence in cases of political interference in the work of 
judges.9 The composition of the HJC is, de facto, entirely determined by 
the National Assembly: it elects 8 out of 11 members of the HJC, while 
the other 3 members-who are members ex officio- are also tied to the 
National Assembly: two of them also elected by the National Assembly 
(the President of the Supreme Court and the Minister of Justice) and 
one is a member of the National Assembly, in charge of the committee 
competent for judicial matters. Severe political interference is even more 
visible when it comes to public prosecutors: the National Assembly elects 
all prosecutors of all levels, including the State Prosecutor, even though 
the Constitution stipulates that the Prosecution is an independent state 
7) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region, EU 
Enlargement Strategy, Brussels, 10.11.2015, p. 5.
8) European Commission. Screening Report Serbia: Chapter 24- Justice, Freedom 
and Security.
9) European Commission. Country Report for Serbia 2015, p. 12.
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body (Article 156), and that all public prosecutors enjoy functional 
immunity (Article 162). Thus, the State Prosecutorial Council (SPC), 
which gathers all prosecutors from the country, is entirely made up of 
officials directly elected by the National Assembly. 
Gaps that exist in the independence of the judiciary are to be addressed 
through the proper amending of the Constitution and, subsequently, 
trough adapting the current legal framework with new constitutional 
provisions.10 In order to remedy the situation and to respond to all of the 
deficiencies the EU had identified, Serbia in its Action Plan for Chapter 
23 has declared its readiness to amend the Constitution in those parts that 
are with concern to the independence of the judiciary and the prosecution. 
These changes ought to be made on the basis of analysis of European best 
practices, as well as a response to the criticism of the Venice Commission 
with regard to the 2006 Serbian Constitution. This task is to be given 
to a special working group for judicial reform. The final result, i.e. the 
adoption of the constitutional changes, is to be done in the last quarter 
of 2017, after which a new constitutional law (i.e. a constitutional act that 
implements new constitutional provisions) should be put in place.11
Both Serbia and the European Commission acknowledge that 
constitutional changes will not automatically lead to an independent 
judiciary and prosecution, but that changes need to take place in the 
legislative framework, as well as in granting greater financial autonomy 
to the HJC and the SPC, in order for them to conduct their affairs in an 
independent manner. However, constitutional changes represent the 
backbone of this process, without which there would be no sufficient and 
sustainable guarantee that there is separation of powers and the prohibition 
of interference of the legislative and the executive in judicial affairs.
Establishing the Constitutional Basis for Membership
One of the most urgent constitutional changes that are needed, when 
the accession to the EU is in sight, is the introduction of the ‘integrative 
clause’, i.e. a constitutional provision which would set forth the possibility 
of transferring constitutional powers to the EU. Even though the EU was 
created as an international organization, through the years it has moved 
a lot from this point, and has created structures that are unprecedented 
in international institutional law. It has acquired competences in various 
10) European Commission, Country Report Serbia 2015, p. 50.
11) Ministry of Justice of Serbia.Action Plan for Chapter 23, p. 30-31.
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fields, all of which came about through member states transferring their 
powers to EU institutions. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) groups these competences (Article 3-6) from those where 
the EU has exclusive competence, through those competences that are 
shared between the EU and member states, all the way to those areas 
where the EU conducts the coordination of state policies, and, ultimately, 
areas where the EU offers support and supplement actions of member 
states. A broad spectrum of powers which the EU enjoys entails that 
states pursuing a membership within this organization ought to have 
in place legal instrument which would govern the transfer of powers. 
Furthermore, as the competences of the EU increased over the decades, 
it seemed important to broaden the constitutional basis for the transfer of 
sovereign powers for those member states that already had an ‘integrative 
clause’. An example is Germany, which, until the creation of the EU in 1993, 
based its participation in European integration on Article 24 of the Basic 
Law. Unlike Article 24, which south to legalize the internationalization 
of federal sovereign powers of Germany, as a consequence of the anti-
nationalistic approach of the post-War era, the new Article 23 adopts 
the ‘open statehood’ approach for Europeanizing national policy fields 
through the transfer of competences to the EU (Arnold, 2016, pp. 1-2).
The absence of such an ‘integrative clause’ is evident in the Serbian 
Constitution, and it was noticed first of all by the Venice Commission. 
Nonetheless, the Venice Commission Opinion on the Serbian 
Constitution acknowledges that Article 97 of the Constitution could act 
as a possible legal basis, if an ‘integrative clause’ was not introduced by 
the accession date.12 Article 97 (1) regulates the fields of competence of 
the Republic and it outlines that “The Republic of Serbia shall organize 
and provide for: sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and 
security of the Republic of Serbia, its international status and relations 
with other countries and international organisations”. However, it would 
be a leap of faith to consider this provision sufficient in establishing a 
legal mechanism for the transfer of sovereign powers. In order to justify 
this argument, one can take the example of Croatia, which changed 
its Constitution precisely for this reason: to introduce an ‘integrative 
clause’. The Croatian Constitution beforehand contained a provision 
that allowed Croatia to enter with other countries into associations and 
alliances (Article 135). Despite this, it was realized that a new provision 
12) European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). 
Opinion on the Constitution of Serbia. March 2007, p. 7.
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should be introduced which would explicitly refer to the transfer of 
sovereign powers to the EU, as well as to regulate rights and obligations 
that stem out of the membership status (Article 141a). Therefore, the 
absence of such a provision would possibly endanger Serbia’s accession 
to the EU, since it would put into question the constitutionality of such 
a move, indeed because the membership in the EU cannot be equaled to 
membership in ‘classic’ international organisations. 
If the issue of the ‘integrative clause’ is resolved, the focus moves 
on to the problem of relationship between the two legal systems- the 
European and the Serbian one. Basis for this kind of a regulation can be 
found in Articles 16 and 194 of the Constitution. By analyzing Article 
16 it can be concluded that Serbia opts for a monist approach towards 
international law, considering that this provision envisages direct 
effect of international agreements. If this recognition of direct effect 
could be extended from international agreements to legislative acts of 
EU institutions as well, there would be no problem with accepting one 
of the fundamental principles of EU law- direct effect. As always, the 
devil is in the detail. Unlike Article 16, Article 194 does not mention 
that international agreements have direct effect- rather it only states that 
they represent a part of the Serbian legal order. Problems which emerge 
through simultaneously reading the two articles is something that the 
Venice Commission refers to in its Opinion on the Serbian Constitution. 
Such inconsistencies could prove problematic for proper interpretation.13
With the accession to the EU, not only the status of the country, but 
also the status of individual citizens will be affected. Namely, citizens of 
an acceding country will become citizens of the EU and will be afforded 
rights that stem from such a status. European citizenship is given to 
every individual who has the nationality of a member state. However, 
European citizenship is additional and does not replace national 
citizenship. Therefore, member states are still in charge of defining 
conditions for acquiring and loss of citizenship. However, constitutional 
significance of European citizenship has been emphasized by the ECJ in 
cases such as Rottmann, Case C-135/08,[2008], where it stipulated that 
the conditions laid down by member states should not affect the rights 
conferred to citizens through EU law, and that cases referring to these 
issues can be subject to judicial review in light of general principles of 
the European legal order.
13) European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). 
Opinion on the Constitution of Serbia. March 2007, p.7.
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The need for introducing special constitutional provisions for regulating 
rights of European citizens was recognized in the process of Croatia’s 
accession to the EU, and a new article was introduced to the Croatian 
Constitution, which enumerates basic rights European citizens enjoy 
(Article 146).The Croatian solution in addressing this issue might be a 
good path for how Serbia should handle it: on the one hand, granting 
Serbian citizens’rights and freedoms stemming from EU law, and, on 
the other hand, guaranteeing other European citizens the same rights 
and freedoms on its territory.
Issues for Further Debate: Supremacy of European Union Law
Apart from the direct effect principle, EU law, according to the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), is supreme in its 
interactions with national legal systems. This principle was inaugurated 
in a famous judgment in the Costa v ENEL case, and was further 
elaborated in Internationale Handelsgesselschaft, Simmenthal and 
other cases. In the Costa judgment, Case 6-64, [1964], E.C.R, the ECJ 
solved the issue of hierarchy of norms between the Union order and 
the national legal orders. Supremacy of Union law was founded upon 
the importance of its uniform application in national legal systems, as 
well as the fulfillment of the necessity to combat potential infringement 
upon the authority of this supranational order (Čavoški, 2013, p. 88).
Afterwards, the ECJ went beyond what it conceptualized in Costa, ruling 
in Internationale Handelsgesselschaft, Case 11-70, [1970], E.C.R,that 
EU law takes precedence over the national law as a whole, including 
constitutional law. However, in taking the endeavor of introducing the 
concept of supremacy, the ECJ was faced with the task of determining 
the faith of national norms that contradict and conflict the Union legal 
order. The answer was found in the Simmenthal, Case 106-77, [1978], 
E.C.R, case, where the ECJ said that the principle of supremacy renders 
all conflicting national law inapplicable and precludes the valid adoption 
of new legislative measures which would be contradicting to Union law.
The Serbian Constitution, apart from adopting a monist perspective 
towards the relationship between international and municipal law, also 
accepts the notion of supremacy of international agreements over national 
legislation. This relationship stems from Article 194 which envisages 
that laws and other general legal acts must be in conformity not only 
with the Constitution, but also with international agreements. However, 
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international agreements are of lower legal value than the Constitution 
and must be in conformity with it, whereas the Constitutional Court is 
charged with ruling on the constitutionality of treaties- something which 
has been criticized as a possible trigger for international accountability 
of Serbia, since the Constitutional Court can assess the constitutionality 
of treaties only after they have been signed and ratified.14Moreover, 
when this constitutional solution is put side by side with EU law, 
other problems can be detected as well. This kind of authority of the 
Constitutional Court allows for the possibility for it to adjudicate the 
cases on constitutionality of EU Founding Treaties, as well as to interpret 
them. This is a clear breach of primary EU law, since the ECJ is the 
only institution afforded with the task of interpreting and assessing the 
validity of EU law, and even it cannot pass judgments on the validity of 
primary EU law, but can only interpret it. Even though it does happen 
from time to time that national constitutional and supreme courts take 
on cases where they interpret EU law and even impose restrictions on its 
effect, nevertheless these kind of situations, for the sake of legal certainty, 
should be dismissed as soon as possible. It should start with abolishing 
the ex post assessment of constitutionality of international agreements, 
which would be replaced with ex ante constitutional review.
Since Articles 16 and 194 of the Constitution lay the basis for creating 
a supra-legal effect of international agreements, and, therefore, the EU 
law itself, the question remains should future constitutional changes go 
the next step and acknowledge the supremacy of EU law over the whole 
of Serbian law. Supremacy of EU law has been formulated and developed 
in the case law of the ECJ, and, so far, it has not been codified in primary 
EU law (with the exception of the failed Constitutional Treaty which 
did contain a provision which stipulated the supremacy of EU law). 
Therefore, there are no specific requirements on this issue for acceding 
countries. Due to this, member states range from those which jealously 
still cling to the traditional concept of national and state sovereignty (e.g. 
Poland), through those member states that have positioned themselves 
somewhere along the concept of constitutional pluralism, which entails 
the acceptance of a special status for EU law, all the way to member 
states which have constitutionally subordinated their legal system to EU 
law, through welcoming the full effect of the principle of supremacy of 
EU law (Chalmers, Davies, Monti, 2009, pp. 190-197).
14) European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). 
Opinion on the Constitution of Serbia. March 2007, p. 6.
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Further debate should be conducted on these issues. Of course, Serbia 
does not face any hard conditioning as far as supremacy of EU law is 
concerned. There are no obstacles even if Serbia decides to keep the current 
constitutional solution, or even if it decides to take the path of adopting 
a dualist approach towards the relationship between international and 
municipal law. However, this could lead to dangers of conflicts between 
the two legal systems and would possibly, as it did in Poland, manifest 
itself in the form of Constitutional Court challenging many of EU acts 
that are not in conformity with Serbian laws. Nonetheless, at this point it 
would be too much to suggest that Serbia should reform its Constitution 
towards a broad acceptance of the principle of supremacy of EU law. The 
solution should, as always, be found somewhere in the middle. Namely, it 
could be considered that constitutional review should be arranged in the 
same way the legislative competences between the EU and member states 
is done. In the area of exclusive competences, where the legislature has no 
competences in passing laws anymore, the principle of supremacy of EU 
law should completely be accepted. Following this line of argument, the 
Constitutional Court should be stripped of its powers to interpret EU law 
and to decide upon its validity in this field. As far as shared competences 
are concerned, the national legislature operates only if the EU decides not 
to practice its powers in the given area, or if it decides to task the national 
legislature with the power to regulate the given area. Serbia ought to 
invest in applying a form of the approach guided by the constitutional 
pluralism doctrine, which grants EU law a special status, but within a 
framework of fundamental principles set forth by the Constitution, such 
as fundamental rights, rule of law, separation of powers, etc. This would 
mean that the Constitutional Court would conduct the ultra vires control 
of activities of EU institutions, i.e. check whether they are acting within 
their legally established lines of competence. Through such a function, 
the Constitutional Court should perform the task of safeguarding the 
principles that represents the core of the national constitutional system 
(Chalmers, Davies, Monti, 2009, p. 197).
Conclusion
Serbia has already pledged to adapt its Constitution in accordance with 
the requirements laid down in the accession process. However, the 
set of planned reforms is not going to be sufficient. Serbia is not only 
going to have to tackle the issues of safeguarding the independence and 
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impartiality of its judiciary and the prosecution, but it will also have to 
address some key constitutional issues, even those that are at the heart 
of a country’s constitutional identity, such as the transfer of sovereign 
rights, supremacy and direct effect of EU law, limiting the competences 
of the Constitutional Court on some matter, etc. Since on many of these 
issues there are no hard conditions set out, nor strict rules that acceding 
countries have to abide by, Serbia can easily pick and choose with 
elements to implement and which to ignore. However, Serbia should 
also keep in mind that, through acceding to the Union, it is also entering 
a completely different international legal regime, which sits on its own 
rules.Conducting a wholesome change to the constitutional system 
could be beneficial, as it would eliminate many of the problems that 
could occur in cases of emergence of conflict between two legal systems 
jurisdictions.
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